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Belief in Film: A Defense of False Emotion and 
Brother Sun, Sister Moon 
 
In one of his few pronouncements on the subject, Jacques Derrida addresses 
the issue of belief in cinema by saying that, “There is an altogether singular mode 
of believing in cinema: a century ago, an unprecedented experience of belief was 
invented […]. At the movies, you believe without believing, but this believing 
without believing remains a believing” (Derrida 2001, 27). In what follows, I 
explore this tantalising definition of cinematic belief as a belief without belief 
by briefly considering the way in which film theory and film-philosophy have 
engaged with the question of belief in cinema. I also take into account Simon 
Critchley’s discussion of religious belief in The Faith of the Faithless (2012) 
within the context of anthropological studies of religion such as that by Émile 
Durkheim. In addition, I discuss Sigmund Freud’s 1927 reflection on religion in 
“The Future of an Illusion”.  I then show that this line of thought can be linked to 
the philosophical discussion around the so-called paradox of fiction and 
introduce the idea that belief can be understood itself as an emotion or mood. I 
argue in favour of the solution to the paradox that claims that emotions 
experienced in response to fictional entities are quasi-emotions but radicalise 
this claim by showing that this must imply that all emotions are in fact 
structured like quasi-emotions and that we do not require an essentialist 
understanding  of emotion in the first place. Throughout I use the example of 
the various cinematic representations of the life of St Francis to flesh out the 
argument, including Roberto Rossellini’s Francesco, giullare di Dio / Francesco, 
God’s Jester / The Flowers of St Francis (1950) but particularly Franco 
Zeffirelli’s much maligned Brother Sun, Sister Moon (1972). 
     Zeffirelli Rediscovers God 
Franco Zeffirelli (b. 1923) began his career in the arts with an interest in 
theatre and particularly opera, but also worked extensively in his youth with 
the Italian filmmakers associated with Italian neo-realism, especially Roberto 
Rossellini and Luchino Visconti. In 1957, he was given the opportunity to 
direct a film called Camping, “about the adventures of two young lovers on 
motorcycles” (Zeffirelli 1986, 140), and, as with many of his future films, this 
proved popular with audiences but was damned by critics. Following a near ten 
year hiatus, Zeffirelli became an international sensation with his two 
Shakespeare adaptations, The Taming of the Shrew (1967) and Romeo and Juliet 
(1968). The former, starring Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton, was a 
particularly popular success (Zeffirelli, 224), as was Romeo and Juliet, which 
was nominated for a number of Oscars in 1969, including for best film and best 
director.  
However, Zeffirelli was involved in a serious car crash on 17 January 
1969 (Zeffirelli, 232) which precluded him from helping with the promotion of 
the film which, according to him, resulted in Romeo and Juliet only winning 
awards for costumes and cinematography at the Academy Awards. In his eyes, 
this “was a setback, as that year had really established me as an international film 
director” (Zeffirelli, 240). Nevertheless, Paramount, which had distributed the 
film in the United States, were happy to offer him an “excellent five-year film 
contract” (Zeffirelli, 240) which allowed him to propose filming a life of the 
medieval Catholic saint, Francis of Assisi (b. 1182 - d. 1226). 
While it is clear that Zeffirelli’s turn to such an overt religious subject 
was in part due to his personal experience of a near-fatal accident and 
encroaching middle-age (cf. Zeffirelli, 246), he was nevertheless very aware of 
the political echoes of the story of a rich young man who decides to cast off his 
material possessions and live a simple life close to nature. Zeffirelli explains: 
The tale was simple enough, though clearly the emphasis 
would be on its contemporary relevance. St Francis was a holy 
revolutionary: his concept of a non-violent, pacific reversal of the 
greed and laziness that he felt had crept into the church and indeed 
the world of his day was obviously akin to the spirit of the 1960s. 
If peace and love was the slogan of the decade then here was a 
story to match it. (Zeffirelli, 240-241) 
Brother Sun, Sister Moon takes its title from the single piece of extant 
writing attributed to Francis, his “Canticle of the Sun” written in Umbrian 
dialect rather than the more usual Latin (see Robert Steele’s  translation    in 
“The Mirror of Perfection” 1910, 294-295), in which Francis famously 
praises God for the elements of the natural world: 
Be Thou praised, my Lord, with all Thy 
creatures, above all Brother Sun, 
who gives the day and lightens us therewith. 
 
[…] 
Be Thou praised, my Lord, of Sister Moon and the stars, in the heaven has 
Thou formed them, clear and precious and comely. 
 
Zeffirelli’s reversion to a fairly direct experience of faith (“If, before, I had 
often considered that the role of destiny was important in my life, now I began to 
reinterpret this as providence, as if there was a guiding hand directing my 
decisions” [Zeffirelli 1986, 246: my emphasis) was couched within a quaint 
Catholic hypocrisy. Zeffirelli saw his homosexuality (unacknowledged as yet in 
his 1986 autobiography) as an unequivocal sin: “My private life is what it is, but 
my religious convictions are unwavering. I believe totally in the teachings of the 
Church and this means admitting that my way of life is sinful.” (Zeffirelli 1986, 
241) 
The director  therefore absolutely believes, but still acts in a way contrary to 
the apparent implications of that belief. Zeffirelli draws comfort from the 
consideration that, according to Catholic doctrine, such “sins of the flesh” are 
not “mortal sins” (241), and are therefore subject to forgiveness via confession. 
Such theological sophistry is gently humorous in Zeffirelli’s account,t but it is 
important that the rediscovery of his religious faith is couched in emotional 
terms, rather than expressed through doctrinal adherence. We might say that 
Zeffirelli rediscovers belief, rather than religion. Belief, then, is an experience 
in and of itself and, following his car crash, Zeffirelli finds belief, not God. This 
particular structure of thinking about belief can be found in Brother Sun, Sister 
Moon.  
Brother Sun, Sister Moon  
   Taking  seriously the insight that the story of St Francis reflected   in some 
way the zeitgeist of the late 1960s, Zeffirelli first approached the Beatles to 
appear as monks in the film, and in his typically insouciant name- dropping style, 
explains: 
I suppose at a human level I found Ringo the most open and 
friendly, but I soon saw that to get anywhere you had first to 
convince Paul of an idea, and then get John to deal with the 
practical problems. I managed eventually to get that far, but as soon 
as John and I began to work out a schedule, it was instantly clear 
how impossible the whole thing was. (Zeffirelli 1986, 241) 
Before eventually settling on unknowns Judi Bowker and Graham 
Faulkner for the roles of Clare and Francis, Zeffirelli considered Al Pacino 
(who apparently passed on the screen test to Francis Ford Coppola for The 
Godfather) and Isabella Rossellini, and this imaginary film, including the 
Beatles, must surely be one of the great never-realised projects in cinema 
history. Nevertheless, Brother Sun, Sister Moon presents an emotionally 
innocent, if not naive, experience; that, according to Zeffirelli, was one of 
the reasons that the film was so derided critically outside of Italy: 
As 1971 began and the film took shape, I started to have niggling 
doubts about what would become of it. Watching the various 
scenes cut together, I realised just how much the film was rooted in 
the 1960s, yet now that the 1970s were unfolding it was clear that 
a massive change had taken place. Young people were no longer 
espousing peace and love; they were out on the streets protesting 
against the Vietnam War, throwing bricks, burning draft cards and 
fighting with the police. Since the events in Paris in 1968 a 
creeping mood of anger and violence had spread through the 
major cities. Brother Sun began to look almost naïve in the face of 
such cynicism. (Zeffirelli 1986, 256-257) 
 
The film opened in New York in 1972 and was met with “mocking 
laughter at the idea of love and gentleness” (265) while its Easter 1973 
release in London was “greeted with no more enthusiasm, though with less 
derision” (266). While critically disastrous, the film has gone on to become 
a perennial success, especially with religious believers (267).1 Zeffirelli’s 
unabashed sentimentality has often been criticised but he is astute in 
recognizing the contradiction between popular acceptance and political 
savaging. Speaking of the “sentimental horror,” The Champ (1979), Zeffirelli 
complained: “Once again I was confronted by the ludicrous contradiction 
that the radical tradition ought to be a popular one and yet, if one tries to 
create a work for the mass audience which honestly appeals to their best 
instincts, the Leftists, of all people, can’t resist the temptation to be snobbish 
about such a work”. (Zeffirelli 1986, 308) 
It is this appeal to the emotional that Zeffirelli sees at the core of cinema 
itself. He writes early on in his memoirs, “I am still very vulnerable to cinema; 
even today I laugh and cry openly and believe quite passionately in what is 
taking place on screen” (Zeffirelli 1986, 15: my emphasis). The cinema is a 
place of belief, and that belief is a passionate emotional experience. Brother 
Sun, Sister Moon is a film that celebrates emotion, and is unabashed in 
wearing this sentimentality on its sleeve. 
The Life of St Francis in Cinema 
The biography of Giovanni di Pietro di Bernardone (commonly known 
as Francesco, and later as St Francis of Assisi) is particularly well served by 
three relatively contemporary biographical accounts. The Life of St Francis, 
written in support of Francis’s beatification thirty-four years after his death by 
St Bonaventure (himself canonised a few hundred years later), was published 
in 1260 and is a fairly straightforward account of the life and miracles of 
Francis. The Little Flowers (Fioretti) and Mirror of Perfection are 
collections of vignettes originally written in Latin during or shortly after 
Francis’s life but only translated into Italian and published in the 1300s. 
While The Life is a fairly dry ecclesiastical account, the Fioretti and Mirror 
read more like folk tales. As Okey puts it, “The Life by St. Bonaventura is 
the Vita at Miracula of a conventional hagiographer, and the real St. Francis 
shines but dimly through its ornate periods; but the Fioretti and the 
Speculum, later in date thought they be, are based on the ingenuous records, 
written and oral, of the saint’s intimate, faithful, and steadfast followers” 
(Okey at al. 1911, xx). 
Born in 1182 in the Italian region of Umbria, not far north of Rome, 
Francis was brought up in a wealthy home supported by his father’s dye 
works. In 1202, Francis joined the conflict with the neighbouring district of 
Perugia, and was held captive for a year before returning to Assisi. Between 
1204 and 1209 he was taken ill, and during a pilgrimage to Rome, Francis, 
“at prayer before the crucifix at St. Damian’s, the mysterious voices called 
him, like St. Augustine of old, to the service of a Lord and ideals far removed 
from those with which the troubadours of Provence had fired the minds  of 
the youth of Italy” (Okey et al. 1911, viii). Francis then denounced his 
worldly privileges and left to restore “the forsaken little Benedictine oratory 
of St. Mary of Porziuncula (the Little Portion)” (Okey et al., viii), even now 
visible from Assisi itself (although cloaked by the Renaissance Basilica of 
Saint Mary of the Angels). Francis was quickly joined by a group of friars 
and also inspired his childhood friend, Chiara Offreduccio, to form the Poor 
Clares, a Franciscan order of nuns. In later life, Francis gave up his official 
duties within the Order, retired as a virtual hermit and was apparently 
afflicted or blessed with the physical stigmata of Christ. He died at the age of 
forty-four in 1226. This later period of his life is not covered in Brother Sun, 
Sister Moon since Zeffirelli saw the later Francis as “a rather tortured mystic, 
uncompromising and tetchy” (Zeffirelli 1986, 255), the portrayal of which 
would have altered the tone of the film. 
Francis has been frequently portrayed in cinema since the silent era, 
including Il Poverello d’Assisi (Enrico Guazzoni, 1911), Frate sole (Ugo 
Falena and Mario Corsi, 1918) and Frate Francesco (Giulio Antamoro, 
1927). In 1950, following the successes, of Rome, Open City (Roma, città 
apart, 1945), Paisá (1946) and Stromboli, Land of God (Stromboli, terra di 
Dio, 1949), among others, Roberto Rossellini directed Francis, God’s Jester 
(The Little Flowers of St Francis; Francesco, giullare di Dio). The film, as its 
American title suggests, is based on the various escapades of the early 
Franciscan monks at the Porziuncula before they disperse to preach to the 
rest of the world. 
Rossellini concentrates more on the life of one of brothers, Juniper 
(Ginepro), who has a section of the original Fioretti dedicated to him. 
Juniper is somewhat of an idiot savant, who plays the role of the simply 
unquestioning follower of Francis and his teachings. The subject was an odd 
choice for Rossellini at the height of his fame, but, as Peter Brunette explains: 
“postwar Europe was rapidly losing the spiritual values that had brought it 
through the terrors of war, and it is his urge to resuscitate this lost faith that 
accounts for the strong religious strain of the films of this period” (Brunette 
1987, 96). 
Crucially, for the argument developed in this article, Brunette says that, 
“for Rossellini the mere existence of faith is finally more important than  its 
object” (Brunette, 96). Thus Rossellini “unashamedly offers Saint Francis 
and his philosophy as answers, as a way back to an essential wholeness” 
(Brunette, 131), and this wholeness is one predicated on faith, but not on 
belief in a specific theological doctrine. This faith, as we will see in our 
discussion of Critchley, is really a faith in the possibility of a future, rather 
than in any sort of divinity.2 
Hollywood has only come calling once on this revered Saint. Michael 
Curtiz, of Casablanca (1942) fame, directed Francis of Assisi in 1961, a 
rather theatrically bland production. The Italian director Liliana Cavani, an 
avowed atheist, has produced three filmed versions of St Francis over a span 
of fifty years. In 1966, she directed Fancesco di Assisi for RAI 
Radiotelevizione which followed Rosselini’s sparse black and white style in 
Jester, although Cavani’s framing is more stylised, and gives a Marxist spin 
to the story as Francis radicalises the poor. After her most well known film 
outside of Italy, The Night Porter (1974), Cavani, somewhat incredibly, 
returned to Francis in 1989 with Fancesco starring Mickey Rourke as the 
titular saint and Helena Bonham-Carter as Clare. Moving on from this 
unmitigated disaster, Cavani has made a further version of Francesco 
(2014), inspired by the election of Ramón José Castellano to the papacy in 
2013 and his adoption of the title Pope Francis. A recent French, Belgian 
and Italian production, The Dream of Francis (Il sogno di Francesco, 
Renaud Fely and Arnaud Louvet, 2016) follows the life of Elias of Cortona, 
the friar chosen by Francis to administer the Order in his stead on his 
retirement. 
However, my main interest here is Zeffirelli’s Brother Sun, Sister Moon, 
which is by far the most sentimental of the St Francis films. As discussed 
above, it is this very sentimentality that Zeffirelli sees as contributing to the 
film’s  critical failure, since it was no longer in tune with the cynicism of  
the 1970s. Perhaps most obviously, Donovan’s faux medieval and “hideously 
sickly” (Milne 1973, 76) songs, with their literal lyrics sung in an affected, 
mournful tone, make too overt a call to emotional reaction. The film’s images 
are almost parodic in their evocation of natural beauty, and, in particular, 
Clare’s backlighting (Fig. 1) is difficult to take seriously. Such overdetermined 
signification seems to call for ironic laughter. 
This problem of taste and reaction is difficult to police, but an audience 
could, and perhaps should, react to the film on that film’s own terms. We 
should try to eradicate the ironic distance that would make us think of 1970s 
shampoo adverts; rather, we should understand and experience these images 
as if they were being offered to us in good faith. Clare is beautiful, and nature 
is wonderful and it is, as Donovan sings, a “lovely day”. The film asks us to 
believe in its sentimental depiction of the world, and if we are able to react 
with the proper emotional force, then, and only then, will we experience the 
film fully, and feel the belief that is the core emotion of the religious world 
depicted in Brother Sun, Sister Moon. 
Sequences throughout the film ask audiences to believe in the 
unbelievable. Francis is both beautiful and good. Animals trust him, as    do 
humans. The Umbrian countryside is gorgeous, in a way that seems 
impossible. The film gives us an awe inspiring vision of the world of medieval 
Italy, and only if the spectator succumbs to this emotional blackmail can one 
truly experience the film as a film. We still know that this is a fiction (and 
a quite implausible one at that), but, nevertheless, we can experience the 
emotion of believing that such a world is possible. This is what I call false 
emotion, or quasi-emotion, without any negative connotations. Just because 
my emotion is “false” does not mean that I do not truly experience it. This is 
the paradox of fiction. 
The Paradox of Fiction 
Cinema is often discussed in terms of its emotional effects. Because 
of the (supposed) close analogy between film and the structure of 
consciousness, it is considered to be a privileged medium, uniquely able   to 
elicit emotions (Plantinga 2009, 48-49). I wish to remain agnostic about 
privileging cinema over other fictional forms in this regard. Theorists and 
philosophers interested in literature or music make equally strong claims for 
their chosen media (see for instance, Hogan 2011; Juslin and Sloboda 2010), 
and it seems clear to me that issues of taste and happenstance have a large 
part to play in such contentions. 
In addition, I stress the fictional aspect of narrative cinema because I 
wish to sidestep the issue of the indexical relationship, in C.S. Peirce’s sense, 
between film’s recording capacity and the real world.3 While there may be 
an argument to made about the way in which the perceived prior existence, 
in the real world, of certain objects or actions in the filmed world has an 
impact on the emotional reaction of viewers.4 Such an investigation would 
have to make use of empirical experimentation and explanation5 in order to 
move beyond psychological guesswork. Nevertheless, let us assume that 
when we watch a good6 fiction feature film we experience something that 
we would probably call an emotional response. This fairly common-sense 
observation is the subject of the so-called “paradox of fiction” which was 
first formulated by Colin Radford in his 1975 discussion, “How Can We Be 
Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?”. 
Radford argues that in order to empathize when we perceive another 
person’s joy or distress, we have to believe that the circumstances affecting 
that person are  real. Radford explains: “It  would seem then that I can  only 
be moved by someone’s plight if I believe that something terrible has 
happened to him. If I do not believe that he has not and is not suffering 
or whatever, I cannot grieve or be moved to tears” (Radford 1975, 68). 
While it is unsurprising that we are moved by depictions of real events 
(such as wars, and other historical occurrences), Radford worries about our 
(apparently) emotional reactions to fictional characters, while nevertheless 
acknowledging that we do indeed seem to react emotionally to such fictions. 
When I watch Brother Sun, Sister Moon and experience the emotion  of 
Francesco’s grandiose renunciation of his personal belongings in front  of 
the Bishop, his parents and the whole town as if it were my own, what 
exactly is happening? Radford would not deny that I feel something, perhaps 
something like belief or faith, as the naked Francesco stands in the archway 
of the town looking out over the Umbrian countryside and stretching out in 
a homoerotic Christ pose. But he is right that I might feel embarrassed at 
reacting in such a way to an obviously calculated and overdetermined 
cinematic manipulation (it is a sign of Radford’s times that he quite easily 
calls such sentimental reactions “unmanly” [70]). Radford accepts that such 
emotions do occur in reaction to fictional narratives, and offers six possible 
solutions for his paradox. 
In his first solution, Radford imagines that we might simply forget that 
we are watching a fiction, and dismisses this as infantile. In the second, we 
“suspend our disbelief ” (Radford, 71), but he finds that such suspension 
would never be sufficiently total to be of help. Thirdly, he considers the 
possibility that such responses may be a “brute fact of human nature” 
(Radford, 72) but that others, who do not enjoy fictions, are not moved in 
such ways. He denies that this is not a universal experience, since everyone 
reacts to lies or other misapprehensions. 
In the fourth solution, we call up possibilities in our mind and react 
emotionally to these imaginings, but this is too close to original problem. 
Developing this somewhat, Radford then suggests that perhaps we react to 
a fictional character by imagining or remembering similar situations that 
have befallen real people. This seems unlikely since, perhaps tautologically, 
“when we weep for Anna Karenina […, we] weep for her” (Radford, 75). 
In his sixth and final solution, Radford says that, 
being moved when reading a novel or watching a play is not exactly 
like being moved by what one believes happens in real life and, 
indeed, it is very different. So there are two sorts of being moved 
and, perhaps, two senses of ‘being moved’. There is being moved 
(Sense 1) in real life and ‘being moved’ (Sense 2) by what happens 
to fictional characters. (Radford, 75) 
 
We thus then have emotions (S.1), those responses to events that we believe 
and know to be real, and quasi-emotions (S.2), those feelings we have when 
we react to situations that we know are fictional. S.1 emotions may have a 
quality of intensity that distinguishes them from S.2 quasi-emotions, since 
“our response to [a] real death is likely to be more massive, more intense 
and longer in duration” (Radford, 77). Thus, finally, we see that there is a 
“necessary presence of belief in the one case and its puzzling absence in the 
other” (Radford, 77), since I need to believe in the reality of the situation in 
order to feel an S. 1 emotion, but do not require such a belief to experience 
an S. 2 emotion. 
But a niggling problem remains: if we require belief in order to feel 
emotions, then what do we need in order to feel quasi-emotions (S. 2)? 
Something like quasi-belief? I q-believe the fiction (which we might call     
a q-reality) and then experience q-emotions. The problem here is that we 
now have two completely different systems: belief, reality, emotion on the 
one side, and running independently across the way, q-belief, q-reality and 
q-emotion. It seems unlikely that we would have such similar processes that 
are necessarily unrelated to each other. If they are related, the problem then 
is to explain the nature of this relationship.7 
The solution might be to reverse the order of the hierarchy that Radford 
implicitly sets up. Instead of imagining that our real emotions respond to 
reality in some sort of innate way (underpinned by our belief, which is really 
a knowledge, in and of that reality), we could imagine that we learn to 
respond emotionally to situations through our understanding of various 
narratives about the way in which humans respond to the world. This line 
of thought undermines any sense of natural emotions and proposes that our 
reactions to the real world (r-world) are based on our experience and 
knowledge of the q-world, the world of fiction and imagination. 
The strength of this position is that it does not lock us into an 
essentialism around emotion - there are no necessary and predetermined 
natural emotional responses and this would allow us to account for culturally 
different emotions, or emotions that have historically fallen away or might 
fall away in the future. It also accounts for the way in which different people 
react to different fictions and to different real situations. Since there is no 
natural emotional reaction, our emotional responses are the result of a 
complex personal and cultural history that is probably more susceptible to 
psychoanalytic explanation than to any sort of emotional cognitivism. The 
primacy of q-emotion gives us the freedom to respond to the world without 
the tyranny of pre-ordination and also to know that our emotions are subject 
to change. However, I am probably now entering the field of experimental 
psychology with such claims and I will stick to arguing that it is fiction that 
allows us to understand our emotions and even to have them in the first 
place.8  
Belief and Faith as Emotions  
   In the paradox of fiction, belief is the foundation on which the 
structure of the problem exists. It is important to know whether or not we 
believe in something, in order to know whether we can have emotional 
responses to it. I have addressed the issue above, but we can complicate this 
notion even further by thinking more carefully about  what  belief itself 
might be. Belief may be succinctly defined as, “the attitude we have, 
roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true” 
(Schwitzgebel 2015). Without delving further into epistemology, I’d like to 
emphasise the “attitude” in this definition. An attitude might be understood 
as an emotion or mood, or even as an “attunement” (Stimmung), if we were 
to move into a more Heideggerian mode (see Sinnerbrink 2012b). Emotions 
are usually understood as being intentional in the phenomenological sense 
that they have an object to which they are necessarily connected: I must fear 
something or be in love with someone. Moods, on the other hand, tend to be 
considered as more formless and not necessarily linked to a particular 
object. Belief, then, could be understood an emotion if it is directed at a 
particular object: I believe that I live in Edinburgh, or I believe in God. Such 
beliefs would have the same structure as an emotion and therefore might be 
considered as such, although belief is not generally listed in the various 
taxonomies of possible emotions (see, for instance, Plantinga 2009, 69). 
It may be difficult to consider belief to be an emotional state while 
carrying out a phenomenological epochē, or bracketing, exercise (see 
Donald Ihde [1986] on the practice of phenomenological reduction). If I am 
watching Brother Sun, Sister Moon and believe that I am in fact seeing  a 
television screen with moving images on it, it is tricky to separate out the 
sensation of “belief ” from the experience of watching that film. I believe 
that I am watching that film because I am experiencing such a viewing. If I 
were hallucinating that I was watching the film, that would make it clearer 
that the “belief ” that I am experiencing something is in fact a certain mode 
of engaging with the world. When I experience the world, I am really 
experiencing my belief in experiencing that world. This would mean that 
“belief ”, like fear or joy, is an emotional reaction to an experience, in this 
case, an engagement with the world. The phenomenological texture of belief 
would then be something like “easy certainty”. I know that I am watching 
Zeffirelli’s film because, obviously, here I am, watching the film. Belief is 
then also a crucial emotion for scepticism, since if an evil demon has indeed 
created the illusion that I am watching a film, then the mechanism that the 
demon has to use in order to create such an illusion is belief itself. The demon 
does not need to create a virtual world in which I experience the watching of 
a film about medieval monks, but merely needs to create the belief that I am 
doing so. This would only be possible if belief had itself a phenomenological 
existence, that it exists as an “attitude”.9 
It may be easier to accept this line of argument if we were to substitute 
the term “faith” for “belief ”. Faith clearly seems to be an emotional state. In 
his classic study The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Émile Durkheim 
states that: 
It is true that religious life cannot reach a certain degree of intensity 
without involving a psychic exaltation that is in some way akin  to 
delirium. For this reason prophets, founders of religions, great 
saints―men with an unusually sensitive religious consciousness 
―very often show signs of excessive and even pathological 
excitability. (Durkheim 1912, 171) 
 
If faith is understood as a form of religious ecstasy, then it seems quite 
uncontroversial to argue that faith is an emotion rather than a reasoned 
position. In a paper from around the same time as Durkheim’s book, A. C. 
Armstrong made the argument that it is incorrect to assimilate “religious 
consciousness” entirely with emotion, since religious thought “contains 
cognitive as well as emotional (and volitional) elements. The affective factors 
depend upon the cognitive, and vary with them” (Armstrong 1911, 75). 
Armstrong is keen to defend the rational basis of religion, admitting that faith 
is indeed a form of feeling, while (following William James) contending that 
emotion “is not mere feeling; […] it is feeling related to ideas” (Armstrong, 
74). Such a claim for a certain modernity in contemporary religion accepts 
that in “its beginnings the religious feeling no doubt manifested itself in the 
simpler and less developed forms of the affective life” (Armstrong, 72), but 
that such “primitive” phases have been, or ought to be, superseded. 
Armstrong is wary of the chaos that a complete assimilation of religious 
faith to sentiment might bring about and so concludes that, “Religious faith 
includes elements of knowledge and of feeling” (Armstrong, 79), with the 
belief that it is knowledge that keeps the excesses of feeling at bay. 
Sigmund Freud presents similar ideas in “The Future of an Illusion”, 
when he argues that “religious ideas have arisen from the same need as have 
all other achievements of civilization: from the necessity of defending oneself 
against the crushingly superior force of nature” (Freud 1927, 21). Religion 
thus has a rational basis which, for Freud, ultimately rests on an analogy 
with childhood psychology, as the gods replace the father in adulthood 
(Freud, 24). He questions, however, any proof of the truth of a religion based 
on “inner experience”, since there are clearly many people who never have 
such a “rare experience” (Freud, 28). He asks: “If one man has gained an 
unshakeable conviction of the true reality of religious doctrines from a state 
of ecstasy which has deeply moved him, of what significance is that to 
others?” (Freud, 28). 
This is the situation in which Francis find himself when God speaks to 
him directly. In Michael Curtiz’s Francis of Assisi (1961), Francis (Bradford 
Dillman) literally hears God’s voice, although the actor speaking the part of 
the divinity is not credited. Bonaventura’s Life of St Francis, written shortly 
after the saint’s death, endorses this particular version of events: “Francis 
trembled, being alone in the church, and was astonied [sic] at the sound of 
such a wondrous Voice, and perceiving in his heart the might of the divine 
speech, was carried out of himself in ecstasy.” (Okey et al. 1911, 311) But 
Curtiz’s film does not provide a very convincing portrayal of faith; the 
spectator has to already believe in the possibility of supernatural voices to 
find these scenes at all moving. The film itself does little to try to persuade us 
of a divine presence. 
In Brother Sun, Sister Moon, Francis is initially dismissed as suffering 
a psychotic breakdown before his personal revelation is made palpable 
through his actions to his various converts. The film underwrites the veracity 
of his faith through the orchestration of the audience’s emotional reaction, 
in its use of soft-focus cinematography, close-ups of emotionally charged 
faces, panoramic shots of nature, and mawkish music. It attempts to instill in 
its viewer an emotional experience that will in some way act as a proxy for 
the “state of ecstasy” felt by Francis. Thus, even if one does not really believe 
in an omnipresent God, one is able to feel that belief in the experience of 
watching a film that creates such a similar emotion in the spectator. This is 
the experience of the quale of a belief, without necessarily having that belief 
as such. 
Belief without Belief at the Cinema 
   It is at this point that we might return to Derrida’s thought at the 
beginning of this article that, “At the movies, you believe without believing, 
but this believing without believing remains a believing” (Derrida, 27). 
Samuel Weber identifies two implications here: 
If I understand the interview, the specific link between “believing 
without believing” and cinema implies (1) specters and (2) the 
déliaison that separates one not just from others in the immediate 
vicinity but from oneself, especially insofar as this Self is habitually, 
routinely constituted—i.e. through repetition of the Same qua 
Identical. (Weber and Kamuf 2015, 152). 
 
Weber highlights the internal differentiation of the supposedly present 
subject that is figured by the metaphor of the ghost. The subject both is and 
is not itself. Weber is also careful not to put too much emphasis on the 
singularity of cinema here. He says that, “Without ceasing to be committed 
to such a Self, one ‘believes’ oneself projected into a spectral reality that is 
cut off from the world of habitual identity” (Weber and Kamuf, 153). In 
other words, the spectator’s belief that he or she is a self-identical subject 
persists, even when that spectator understands this identity to be an illusion. 
However, Weber says, “This is supposed to be distinctive of cinema. But once 
again, this does not seem to be exclusive to cinema” (Weber and Kamuf, 
153). However, this does not in itself mean that we should not pay attention 
to cinema and its specificities. 
Weber also moves the analysis of belief to intersect with emotion, by 
substituting “feeling” for “believing”. He tentatively says, “I think what I want 
to suggest by this substitution is that the experience of believing without 
believing is experienced through feelings, which paradoxically supplement 
the lack of actual physical contact in the relation to film” (Weber and Kamuf, 
154). Weber defines “belief without belief ” as an emotion, a feeling, and so 
gives us a way of understanding this self-cancelling formulation in a less 
gnomic fashion. If “belief without belief ” is, in fact, a felt emotion, this asks 
us to explore the issue of emotional response in more detail. Weber concludes 
that the “way ‘belief ’ is solicited in and by cinema reveals its dependence 
on both desire and feelings, such as anxiety, which is the feeling that seeks 
to overcome and control the heterogeneity of feeling itself ” (Weber and 
Kamuf, 154). Anxiety, then, becomes the central emotion in our experience 
of the fetishistic disavowal at the centre of the cinematic experience and this 
accords very neatly with Freud’s formulation (although Freud does note that 
fetishists in general are quite happy).10 The believer-without-belief, like the 
fetishist, knows very well that there is no God, but nevertheless feels as if 
there is indeed a God. 
Frank Jackson explains that there is something that he calls the qualia 
of experience, those things that cannot be accounted for by a physicalist 
description. He thinks “that there are certain features of the bodily sensations 
especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of 
purely physical information include”. (Jackson 1982, 127) Jackson develops 
his theory about qualia when he imagines Mary, stuck in a black and white 
room, who learns everything there is to learn about the colour red, but when 
released from her lab, actually sees something red and learns something 
new. For Jackson, “The contention about Mary is not that, despite her 
fantastic grasp of neurophysiology and everything else physical, she could 
not imagine what it is like to sense red; it is that, as a matter of fact, she would 
not know” (Jackson 1986, 292). If belief has or is a quale, then even if I study 
religion (by reading the various scriptures and anthropological discussions, 
speaking to many believers, and coming to understand everything there is 
to know about religion), it is only if I suddenly find myself in a world where 
I believe in a religious teaching, that I will know what religion is. However, 
in the fictional world of Brother Sun, Sister Moon I am able to experience the 
quale of belief, without having to believe that God exists. 
Perhaps, then, belief without belief could be better formulated as: 
[Quale of] Belief (QB) without [Content of] Belief (CB). This implies that 
QB is non-intentional ― I can experience belief without having a specific 
belief about anything in the world. QB is therefore something like a mood 
rather than an emotion (which would require an intentional object). 
We could also imagine a zombie worshipper, enacting the rituals 
without feeling any of the “belief ”, but nevertheless acting as if there were 
an omnipotent deity who took an interest in human affairs. Such an adherent 
would have neither QB nor CB, only the outward appearance of belief 
(presumably it would be impossible to have CB without QB). We could  call 
this sort of hypocrisy “Ritual Belief ” (RitB): when I do not believe in the 
content of the belief, I do not experience it, but I follow its rituals and 
strictures since I understand that this is the way in which human societies 
provide a structure for consensus and group action (we could also call 
this Mythic Belief, or even Freudian belief). I don’t believe in the gods of 
the Italians, but, since I live among the Italians in the medieval period, I 
understand that this way of acting collectively provides an important social 
structure and may be the best way for me to achieve personal comfort and 
satisfaction (as long as I stay on the right side of the religious law). This is 
the pragmatic hypocritical position. I may as well act as if I believe, since the 
society in which I find myself sees such belief as a moral good. Conversely, 
if I live in a predominantly secular society, I may as well act as if I do not 
believe in supernatural elements (even if I do). 
We now have three possible types of belief: r-belief (real belief), q-belief 
(quasi-belief) and rit-belief (ritual belief). R-belief, while apparently prior to 
the other two forms and possibly foundational for q-belief, suffers from the 
problem of origin. Where does it come from? How does someone suddenly 
come to the indisputable knowledge that an unfalsifiable proposition is true? 
How does Francs come to the understanding that God is real and speaking 
directly to him? Discounting the possibility that God (as an omnipresent, 
omniscient and omnibenevolent being), has some sort of real existence in 
the world, Francis must experience belief as an overwhelming emotional 
state that does not require the real existence of God since his experience is 
of that faith and not of that God (pace Curtiz’s divine voice). In this sense, 
Francis’s belief must, in the first place, be a q-belief. He feels the belief just 
as I feel it when I watch Brother Sun, Sister Moon. But then, in some way, 
Francesco is able to derail his experience and move from off-line belief to 
on-line belief. We might then need to distinguish between belief, irrational 
belief and insanity, distinctions that Brother Sun, Sister Moon also explores. 
Approaching the issue from the opposite, secular side of things, Simon 
Critchley addresses the problem of faith with the question: “Is politics 
conceivable without religion?” and argues that it is not (Critchley 2012, 24). 
He sees belief as the central issue here. He asks: “So, can a political 
collectivity maintain itself in existence, that is, maintain its unity and 
identity without a moment of the sacred, without religion, rituals, and 
something that we can only call belief?” (Critchley, 24). The argument is 
that a particular community needs to believe in its status as a collective 
community, in order for individuals to act in ways beneficial to the survival 
and stability of that community which may, in the short term, be deleterious 
to the individuals themselves. Critchley’s project is to set up a secular 
foundation for sacrifice in the interest of the fictional community (see 
Critchley, 35-41). After many nuanced explications, Critchley finally comes 
to the conclusion that: “Faith is the enactment of the self in relation to a 
demand that exceeds my power, both in relation to my factical thrownness 
in the world, and the projective movement of freedom achieved as 
responsibility. Faith is not a like-for-like relationship of equals, but the 
asymmetry of the like-to-unlike.” (Critchley, 251) 
Faith and belief by the individual subject in the “unlikely” (the unreal, 
the fictional, the social) is necessary for politics as such, and, for Critchley 
following Derrida, an ethical politics must be underpinned by an 
acknowledgement of the “infinite demand” of never being able to completely 
resolve the conflict between the individual and the social. Francis attempts 
exactly this, by trying, on the one hand, to experience an individual and 
unhypocritical belief in God, but, on the other, to maintain a respect for the 
institution of the church and its political organisation. Both Rossellini and 
Zeffirelli concentrate in their films on the earlier life of the saint, and 
Rossellini particularly stresses the simple life of the community of the 
brothers. However, as Francis’s sect grew in popularity, he himself became 
more separated from social life, and eventually gave up his position with the 
brotherhood and became a hermit, living rather unhappily with his bleeding 
stigmata until his death at forty-four. It would seem that, even for St Francis, 
the infinite demand of the world to come is unbearable. 
Patrick Hogan makes the common sense observation that,“Of course, 
our emotional response to stories is not the same as our actual engagement 
with events that have real consequences for our own practical existence” 
(Hogan 2011, 21: my emphasis). While this would seem uncontroversial, 
since we clearly understand that there is a difference between seeing or 
reading about a fictional love affair and actually falling in love with one’s 
fellow scriptwriter (see Their Finest [Lone Scherfig, 2016]), I am not 
convinced that this distinction is as clearly unproblematic as Hogan and 
many others imagine. 
I do not claim that the fictional world exists in the same ontological 
sense as the everyday world, but rather that our emotional response to 
reality, as commonly understood, and to fiction are not necessarily different. 
This does not mean that we cannot tell the difference between reality and 
fiction, but that our experience of emotion does not make such a difference 
and, more strongly, that our emotions are, for the most part, learned from 
fictional narratives. 
The thought that our real emotions about real people in our real lives are 
not necessarily more complex or heartfelt than those experienced fictionally 
may strike readers as counter-intuitive. However, I wish to argue that, if we 
seriously try to experience our emotions in a phenomenological manner, 
then we might have to admit that there are certain emotions that are far more 
nuanced in our fictional lives than they are in our real lives. In fact, I would 
go further and say that there cannot be a strict distinction, on an emotional 
level, between reality and fiction. When I fall in love with the handsome 
scriptwriter and his unconvincing moustache, is this a stronger experience 
than the one I feel when I empathise with a fictional character doing the 
same? Maybe I will never fall in love, or perhaps there is no such experience 
as “falling in love” in the real world, and that what we call “love” is merely 
a product of expectations learned from fictions. I use the word “merely” in 
the previous sentence ironically, since the upshot of my argument is that all 
of our emotions are learned from fictions. 
This argument is not falsifiable, in a strictly scientific sense. It would 
probably be impossible to test whether a human being brought up without 
any experience of fictional narratives would have a similar range of 
emotional reactions as someone raised in a community. Werner Herzog’s 
Land of Silence and Darkness (1971) explores the experience of people born 
deaf, blind and dumb while his fictionalised bio-pic The Enigma of Kaspar 
Hauser (1974) returns to the perennial story of a child brought up without 
contact with other human beings. In both films, Herzog presents a low- key 
romantic picture in which the apparently de-humanised subject finally finds 
emotion through an experience of nature, not of other human beings. 
Nevertheless, this is conjecture by Herzog and we must remain silent on 
what such emotional experiments may or may not reveal. 
To conclude, I have been arguing that real emotions are only possible 
on the basis of quasi-emotions, and without false emotion there can be no 
real emotional response. A film like Brother Sun, Sister Moon allows an 
experience of faith without faith, of belief without belief, and this experience 
is fundamental to all cinema. 
 David Sorfa 
 
Notes 
 
See Koslovic (2002, 2) for an overview of the critical reception of the film. 
For fuller discussions of Francis, God’s Jester, see Brunette (1987, 128-137), Millen (2000, 80-94) 
and Bandy (2003, 71-74). 
There is an important strand in film theory and film-philosophy, which takes the problem of belief 
and cinema as its object and is concerned specifically with film’s relationship to the real world, 
usually, but not always, from a Heideggerian perspective. Siegfried Kracauer argues that film offers 
a “redemption of physical reality” by which I understand him to mean that film is able to reinvest a 
corrupted world with hope (Kracauer 1960). In the 1940s and 50s, André Bazin wrote extensively on 
the relationship between reality and cinema and Robert Sinnerbrink excavates the way in which Bazin 
understood the photographic nature of cinema as underpinning a belief that the image “bears the trace 
of a former presence” (Sinnerbrink 2012a, 97; see also Rushton 2011, 42-78). Stanley Cavell 
similarly uses cinema as a means for providing a proof against scepticism since if the world can be 
photographed and filmed this must then mean that the world does indeed exist (Cavell, 1979). In this 
tradition, cinema allows the spectator to believe in the world which, since it is so awful and 
unbelievable, requires the countersignature of film to convince us of its worth. Cinema, then, is the 
miracle that proves the existence of the world. 
Berys Gaut has recently developed this argument in terms of an appreciation of the technological 
achievement necessary for creating cinematic artworks. While he argues for the validity of considering 
digital effects as part of a film’s achievement, he is also impressed by Tom Cruise performing his 
own stunts in Mission: Impossible - Ghost Protocol (2011). Gaut concludes that, “Appreciating a 
cinematic artwork depends in part on understanding the technology it incorporates” (Gaut 2016, 
13) and this is in fact an argument for appreciating the manipulation of the real world in real ways, 
whether that be through the skill needed to manipulate technological effects to create a visually 
perceptible and spectacular image or through the acting talent or foolhardiness of an actor. 
Dan Shaw gives a very useful overview of the developments in mirror neuron theory that argues that 
our brains simulate the emotions perceived in others: “The discovery of the existence and emotive 
functions of mirror neurons confirms that we simulate other people’s emotions in a variety of ways, 
even in cinematic contexts. This is made possible by these components of the human brain firing 
identically when we observe others engaged in an activity (or exhibiting a facial expression or body 
language) and when we do so ourselves” (Shaw 2016, 148). This hypothesis would, I think, support 
my general claim that there is no substantive difference between “real” and “fictional” emotions. 
Noël Carroll’s view is that the value of a film can only be judged by the quality of our emotional 
response to it. If we laugh at a comedy and feel fear during a horror film, then that film has been 
successful and can be evaluated as such (Carroll 2003). 
Gregor Currie has proposed the “simulation argument” in which we are able to “run” our emotions 
in an “off-line” mode when engaging with fictions. Currie says that, “these beliefs and desires, let uscall 
them pretend or imaginary beliefs and desires, differ from my own real beliefs and desires not just in 
being temporary and cancellable. They are also, unlike my real beliefs and desires, run ‘off- line’, 
disconnected from their normal perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs” (Currie 1995, 253). The 
distinction I make between real beliefs (r-beliefs) and q-beliefs is very similar to this conception. Currie 
also warns that it is possible for such off-line emotions to go on-line and that if, “imagining alien values 
carried with it the possibility that we may actually come to have those values through failure of inhibition, 
such imaginings expose us and those around us to a real danger, though one we have scarcely begun to 
quantify” (Currie, 259). Anecdotally, some have worried that my engagement with belief and faith in 
Brother Sun, Sister Moon and in this article, might turn me into a believing Christian. See also Berys 
Gaut on the simulation argument (Gaut 2010, 148-150). 
I am aware that there is an issue here if we consider creatures that apparently do not have fictional 
worlds in their ontology. However, it seems to me clear that animals can imagine the future in    one 
way or another and so, on this minimal definition, I would hold that animals are just as much 
fictionally-determined beings as humans. R.M. Sainsbury argues that play, as fictional imagining, is 
available to mammals and even claims that, “Life begins in play, and play involves pretense, making 
things up, fiction” (Sainsbury 2010, 1). See also Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-believe: On the 
Foundations of the Representational Arts (1993). 
For extensive and somewhat different accounts of philosophical and psychological approaches to 
definitions of belief, see Lengbeyer (2009) and Wegener and Clark (2009). 
Freud explains: “For though no doubt a fetish is recognised by its adherents as an abnormality, it is 
seldom felt by them as the symptom of an ailment accompanied by suffering” (Freud 1927, 152
 
